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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Sergey Kalashnikov timely appeals from the district court's order revoking 
probation. On appeal, Mr. Kalashnikov argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied 
him due process and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with 
various transcripts he requested to be created at the public's expense. Additionally, 
Mr. Kalashnikov argues that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his 
probation and imposed an excessively harsh sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Kalashnikov was charged, by Information, with felony grand theft by 
possession, misdemeanor concealment a dangerous weapon, and misdemeanor 
exhibition of a deadly weapon. (R., pp.26-27.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Mr. Kalashnikov pleaded guilty to grand theft by possession and, in return, the State 
dismissed the remaining charges. (R., pp.47-48, 54.) Thereafter, the district court 
entered a withheld judgment and placed Mr. Kalashnikov on a five-year period of 
probation. (R., pp.54-59.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a motion for bench warrant for 
probation violation and an amended motion for probation violation alleging that 
Mr. Kalashnikov violated various terms of his probation. (R., pp.61-64, 84-86.) At the 
probation violation admission hearing, trial counsel noted the Mr. Kalashnikov has an 
immigration hold because he immigrated to the United States in 1991 before the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. (04/26/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.5-12.) Trial counsel went on to 
note that "his situation is kind of strange because there is not a country to send him 
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back to." (Tr., p.10, Ls.8-11.) Mr. Kalashnikov admitted to violating the terms of his 
probation for committing the crime of petit theft, disorderly conduct, and being in 
possession of a controlled substance on two occasions. (R., pp.61-64, 84-86; 04/26/12 
Tr., p.14, L.13 - p.15, L.7.) The district court revoked probation and imposed a unified 
sentence of fourteen years, with three and one-half years fixed. (R., pp.94-96.) 
Mr. Kalashnikov timely appealed. (R., pp.1 06-1 08.) 
Mr. Kalashnikov then filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency, which was 
denied by the district court. 1 (R., pp.97 -98, 116-119.) 
On appeal, Mr. Kalashnikov filed a motion to augment the record with various 
transcripts. (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement 
in Support Thereof (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-3.) The State objected to 
Mr. Kalashnikov's request for the transcripts. (Objection to "Motion to Augment and to 
Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof" (hereinafter, 
Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-3.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered 
an order denying his request for transcripts of the change of plea hearing, held on 
February 28, 2007 and the sentencing hearing, held on June 21, 2007 (Order Denying 
Motion to Augment and suspend the Briefing Schedule (hereinafter, Order Denying 
Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.) 
1 Mr. Kalashnikov is not challenging the denial of his Rule 35 motion on appeal. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Kalashnikov due process and equal 
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Kalashnikov's 
probation? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed and executed a unified 
sentence of fourteen and one-half years for Mr. Kalashnikov's guilty plea to grand 
theft by possession? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Kalashnikov Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary 
Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent 
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the 
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need 
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant 
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to 
the issues raised on appeal. 
In this case, Mr. Kalashnikov filed a Motion to Augment, requesting transcripts of 
the change of plea hearing, held on February 28, 2007 and the sentencing hearing, held 
on June 21, 2007. Those requests were denied by the Supreme Court. On appeal, 
Mr. Kalashnikov is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for the 
transcripts. Mr. Kalashnikov asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the 
issues of whether the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation, and 
whether it abused its discretion by imposing an excessively harsh sentence because the 
applicable standard of review requires an appellate court to conduct an independent 
review the entire proceedings in order to evaluate the district court's 
sentencing/probationary decisions. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in 
denying his request. 
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B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Kalashnikov Due Process And Equal 
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With 
The Necessary Transcripts 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Kalashnikov With 
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process And 
Equal Protection Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate 
Review Of His Sentencing Claims 
The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. 
art. I §13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiterv. Oepanment of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981). Const. 
State V. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State V. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States 
Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh V. State, Dept. of 
Health and Welfare ex reI. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. 
See I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a 
transcript, the transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-
863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates 
the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. I.C.R. 5.2(a). 
Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court .. 
. . " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to 
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be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as 
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a). 
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Oryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these 
cases. The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal 
protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent 
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second 
theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for 
review. The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they 
request. In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal 
protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless 
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the 
State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been 
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase 
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transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme 
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty 
defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as 
follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious 
d iscrim i nations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary 
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
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In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court 
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In 
that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of 
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to 
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access 
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less 
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase 
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of 
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under 
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of 
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their 
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement 
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is 
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the 
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for 
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The 
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be 
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial 
proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the State 
wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id. 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation 
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863). In that case, a transcript was 
necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the 
transcript. Lane, 327 U S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must provide an 
adequate record or face procedural default. "It is well established that an appellant 
bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can 
review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record 
are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court." 
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 
422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. 
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541 
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(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes, 
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible, 
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel 
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's 
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Kalashnikov fails 
to provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply 
and Mr. Kalashnikov's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state 
action alone, which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action 
is a violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer 
apply. 
Whether the transcripts of the requested proceedings were before the district 
court at the time of the probation revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether 
the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal because in reaching a sentencing 
decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the 
hearing from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge 
gained from its own official position and observations. Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 
367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) 
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon 
what the court heard during the trial); State v. Walface, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) 
(recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal 
transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district and the 
quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary 
hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected 
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to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether 
the prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon 
the information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the 
decision to revoke probation. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, 
Docket No 39057, 2012 Opinion No 38 (Ct. App. 2012), which addressed the foregoing 
argument. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on probation Id. 
at 1. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating the terms of his 
probation and the district court revoked probation but retained jurisdiction. Id. at 1-2. 
After he completed his rider, the district court placed the defendant on probation. Id. at 
2. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation and the district court 
revoked probation. Id. The defendant appealed from the district court's second order 
revoking probation. Id. 
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with 
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the 
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal 
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district 
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 2-3. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary 
for the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second probation 
violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its 
revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 4. 
While Morgan does directly deal with the issues raised in this appeal, it is 
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distinguishable because Mr. Kalashnikov is challenging not only the order revoking 
probation, but also the length of his sentence, which entails an analysis of the district 
court's sentencing rationale. 2 
2 Another issue with Morgan is that it invites appellate counsel, in the event an appeal is 
assigned to the Court of Appeals, to file motions directly with the Court of Appeals which 
is not allowed under the Idaho Appellate Rules. In Morgan, the Court of Appeals 
refused to address Mr. Morgan's claim that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due 
process because it does not have the power to overrule a decision by the Idaho 
Supreme Court. Id. at 3. The Morgan Court went on to state that it would have the 
authority to review a renewed motion to augment if it was filed with the Court of Appeals 
after the appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals and contained information or 
argument which was not presented to the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. However, this 
position is untenable because the Idaho Appellate Rules require all motions to be filed 
directly with the Idaho Supreme Court. For example, Idaho Appellate Rule 110 states 
as follows: 
All motions, petitions, briefs and other appellate documents, other than the 
initial notice of appeal, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules with the court heading of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho as provided by Rule 6. There shall 
be no separate filings directed to or filed with the Court of Appeals. In the 
event of an assignment of a case to the Court of Appeals, the title of the 
proceeding and the identifying number thereof shall not be changed 
except that the Clerk of the Supreme Court may add additional letters or 
other notations to the case number so as to identify the assignment of the 
case. All case files shall be maintained in the office of the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court. 
(emphasis added). Furthermore, Idaho Appellate Rule 30 requires that all motions to 
augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant portions of I.A.R. 30 follow: 
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the 
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record. 
Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion 
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and 
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by 
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court. 
(emphasis added). Mr. Kalashnikov is not aware of any court rule which allows a party 
to an appeal to file a motion directly with the Court of Appeals. Idaho Appellate Rule 
110 expressly prohibits such filings. Therefore, the Morgan Court's statement that 
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Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of 
review. The requested transcripts are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review 
all proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court made 
appropriate sentencing determinations. See State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 
28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following 
a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the 
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and 
the revocation of probation." (emphasis added)).3 In other words, an appellate court 
reviewing a district court's sentencing/probationary decision conducts an independent 
review of the entire record to determine if the record supports the district court's 
decisions. This standard of review is necessary in Idaho because judges are not 
required to state their sentencing/probationary rationale on the record. State v. Nield, 
106 Idaho 665, 666 (1984). 
Mr. Morgan could have filed a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of 
Appeals is contrary to the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3 In Morgan, supra, the Court of Appeals clarified the scope of review articulated in 
Hanington. Specifically it held: 
In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily 
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that all 
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane. 
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision 
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues 
which are properly made part of the record on appeal. 
Morgan, at 4. (original emphasis). As stated above, Morgan is distinguishable as 
Mr. Kalashnikov is raising a sentencing claim in this appeal. 
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Further support for Mr. Kalashnikov's position can be found in State v. Warren, 
123 Idaho 20 (Ct. App.1992). In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated 
battery in 1988 and placed on probation. Id. at 21. Mr. Warren's probation was then 
revoked and the district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days. Id. After completing the 
period of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on another period of probation, 
which was ultimately revoked. Id. The district court then sua sponte reduced the length 
of Mr. Warren's sentence. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that the district 
court should have further reduced the length of his sentence. Id. In support of that 
position, Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial. Id. The Court of 
Appeals addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the 
probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must look at the 
nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where Warren bit 
off his victim's ear." Id. However, the Court of Appeals did not address the merits of his 
sentence reduction claim because Mr. Warren had failed to provide a copy of the 
original Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) and a transcript of the 
original sentencing hearing. Id. Even though Mr. Warren did not appeal from the 
original sentence, and the original sentencing hearing occurred years before the 
decision at issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the transcript of that hearing was 
necessary to address Mr. Warren's claims of error. Moreover, there was no indication 
that a transcript of that hearing was created before the probation violation hearing or 
that the district court referenced the original sentencing hearing at the probation 
violation disposition hearing. It appears that the Court of Appeals assumed that the 
original sentencing hearing would address the nature of the original offense. 
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Had Mr. Kalashnikov failed to request the transcripts at issue, the Warren opinion 
indicates that the merits of his sentencing issues would not be addressed on appeal. 
See also Coma, 133 Idaho at 34 ("It is well established that an appellant bears the 
burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can review the 
merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record are missing 
on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court."); State v. Rundle, 
107 Idaho 936, 937 (Ct. App. 1984) ("When a discretionary decision related to 
sentencing is challenged on appeal, the appellant bears the burden of presenting a 
sufficient record to evaluate the merits of the challenge."). 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial 
proceedings on appeal. The requested transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal 
because the applicable standard of review requires the appellate court to conduct an 
impendent review of all of the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard 
of review, the focus is not on the district court's express sentencing rationale4 , to the 
contrary, the question on appeal is if the record itself supports the district court's 
ultimate sentencing/probationary decisions. As such, the decision to deny 
Mr. Kalashnikov's request for the transcripts will render his appeal meaningless 
because it will be presumed that the missing transcripts support the district court's 
sentencing decisions. This functions as a procedural bar to the review of 
Mr. Kalashnikov's appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore, 
4 However, an abuse of discretion might be found if the district court employs a 
particularly unreasonable or absurd sentencing/probationary analysis. Even under 
those circumstances, the appellate court will still employ an independent review of the 
record to determine if the ultimate decision is sound despite the unreasonable analysis. 
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Mr. Kalashnikov should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the 
presumption should not be applied. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Kalashnikov With 
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned 
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricably related to due process that the 
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The 
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was 
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was 
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... 
[to] hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 
'that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of 
free government which no member of the Union may disregard.'" Id. at 71-72. 
In Doug/as v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants 
the right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of 
Doug/as was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
According to the United States Supreme Court: 
In short, the promise of Doug/as that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
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has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397. 
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements 
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an 
active advocate on behalf of his client ... [Counsel's) role as advocate requires that he 
support his client's appeal to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the 
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is 
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor of any 
argument made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Kalashnikov has not 
obtained review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with 
effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of 
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal 
Justice, The Defense Function. These standards offer insight into the role and 
responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
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the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . " Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in sUbstance. 
Standard 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's 
decision to revoke probation. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Kalashnikov on 
the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal. 
Mr. Kalashnikov is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant 
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Kalashnikov his 
constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of 
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access 
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any 
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
II 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Kalashnikov's Probation 
Mr. Kalashnikov asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court 
abused its discretion when it revoked his probation. When a defendant appeals from an 
order revoking probation the Idaho Court of Appeals has utilized the following 
framework: 
The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence 
is within the discretion of the district court. I.C. § 20-222. In a probation 
revocation proceeding, two threshold questions are posed: (1) did the 
probationer violate the terms of probation; and, if so, (2) should probation 
be revoked? State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct. App. 1987). 
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State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Mr. Kalashnikov is not challenging the district court's determination that he 
violated the terms of his probation. Accordingly, he only contests the district court's 
decision to revoke his probation. "A district court's decision to revoke probation will not 
be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion." State v. 
Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). "When a district court's discretionary decision is 
reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine 
whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within 
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable 
to the specific choices before it, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason." 
State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923 (Ct. App. 2003). "In deciding whether revocation 
of probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether the 
probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is 
consistent with the protection of society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 
2001 ). 
As a preliminary note, Mr. Kalashnikov completed four years of probation before 
the State alleged that he violated his probation. (R., p.116.) Mr. Kalashnikov was 
working toward certification as a journeyman carpenter in the carpenter's union and had 
completed 4,100 hours of the required 4,800 hours. (05/31/12 Tr., p.29, Ls.12-23.) 
However, in 2009, Mr. Kalashnikov lost his job and was not able to find work. (05/31/12 
Tr., p.29, L24 - p.30, L9.) Mr. Kalashnikov's wife left him with his best friend and 
moved to Texas. (05/31/12 Tr., p.28, L 16 - p.29, L 11.) Mr. Kalashnikov's behavior 
may also be explained by his addiction to methamphetamine. (05/31/12 Tr., p.28, L16-
p.29, L 11.) Other than a petty theft in the value range of $225.00, most of the 
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probation violations occurred in a sixty day period of time after his wife left him. 
(05/31/12 Tr., p.28, L.16 - p.29, L.11, p.33, L.17 - p.34, L.5.) 
There are mitigating explanations for Mr. Kalashnikov's behavior while on 
probation. Mr. Kalashnikov was involved in an incident where he was in a police 
vehicle that had equipment utilized by law enforcement. (05/31/12 Tr., p.25, L.12 - p.26, 
L.10.) According to trial counsel, the police vehicles were legally purchased at an 
auction, and some of the items were still in the cars. (05/31/12 Tr., p.30, L.22 - p.31, 
L.9.) Trial counsel also stated that there was no indication that Mr. Kalashnikov was 
trying to impersonate a police officer. (05/31/12 Tr., p.32, Ls.1-6.) It was also alleged 
that Mr. Kalashnikov falsified his employment record, but trial counsel argued that it was 
difficult for him to document his employment because the carpenters union moved him 
from one job to another. (05/31/12 Tr., p.35, Ls.11-20.) Mr. Kalashnikov would like to 
point out that his probation officer stated the he was deceitful from the beginning of his 
probation, but that officer was not his first probation officer and he was appointed as his 
officer at the same time when Mr. Kalashnikov's wife left him. (05/31/12 Tr., p.39, LA -
pAD, L.16.) As such, that statement does not accurately reflect the whole of 
Mr. Kalashnikov's probation and really only reflects the worst period of his period of 
probation. 
Mr. Kalashnikov had no disciplinary sanctions during his period of incarceration 
prior to the probation violation disposition hearing. (05/31/12 Tr., p.34, L.23 - p.35, 
L.i0.) Mr. Kalashnikov does have employment opportunities, as a superintendent of a 
construction company wrote the district court indicating that he was eligible for hire if he 
was placed on probation. (05/31/12 Tr., p.36, Ls.3-14.) During this period of time, 
Mr. Kalashnikov also completed the Ada County New Direction program, which deals 
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with inmates that have substance addiction problems. (Presentence Investigation 
Report, (hereinafter, PSI), p.1 94l 
According to trial counsel, Mr. Kalashnikov does not pose a significant risk to 
society at this point in time because he "has learned his lesson." (05/31/12 Tr., p.37, 
Ls.15-23.) 
In sum, Mr. Kalashnikov was performing relatively well on probation until his wife 
left him and he quickly spiraled downward. However, that does not accurately reflect 
the whole of his performance on probation. As such, the district court abused its 
discretion when it revoked probation. 
III. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed And Executed a Unified 
Sentence Of Fourteen Years, With Three And One-Half Years Fixed, For 
Mr. Kalashnikov's Guilty Plea To Grand Theft By Possession 
Mr. Kalashnikov asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of 
fourteen years, with three and one-half years fixed is excessive. Where a defendant 
contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence the 
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving consideration to 
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public 
interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Kalashnikov does not allege 
that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an 
5 Citations to the PSI will adhere to the pag!iY3tion contained in the electronic PSI. 
abuse of discretion, Mr. Kalashnikov must show that in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
As a preliminary note, Mr. Kalashnikov received a unified sentence of fourteen 
years, with three and one-half years fixed, but the prosecutor recommended a unified 
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.94-96; 05/31/12 Tr., p.24, Ls.4-9.) 
Mr. Kalashnikov argues that his deportation status is a mitigating factor and that 
the district court improperly weighed it as an aggravating factor when it was used as the 
main reason to deny his request for probation. The Idaho Court of Appeals has noted 
that deportation or removal is an appropriate consideration for a trial court in fashioning 
a sentence and it is an abuse of discretion to omit this as a sentencing consideration. 
State v. Tinoco-Perez, 145 Idaho 400, 402 (Ct. App. 200S).6 In fact, "for many non-
citizens, any term of imprisonment imposed by the court will be quite secondary to the 
immigration consequences in impact on the defendant's life and future." Id. 
Mr. Kalashnikov also has an immigration hold but when he came to the United States 
the Soviet Union existed. (05/31/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.S-11.) Mr. Kalashnikov might not be 
accepted by the modern Russian Federation. (05/31/12 Tr., p.32, L.6 - p.33, L.3.) As 
such, Mr. Kalashnikov's immigration status and the complications caused by the fall of 
the Soviet Union are mitigating factors. 
6 "Although the risk of deportation or other impact on immigration status is generally 
considered a 'collateral consequence' of a criminal conviction, Retamoza v. State, 125 
Idaho 792, 796-97 (Ct. App. 1994), it nevertheless is often a very significant 
consequence for the defendant." Id. 
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There are other mitigating factors present in this matter which support the 
conclusion that Mr. Kalashnikov's sentence is excessively harsh. Mr. Kalashnikov has 
family support in Califomia and support from a local church. (05/31/12 Tr., p.36, L.15 -
p.37, L.14.) He also has support from the Slavic Community Center in Sacramento 
California, which helps integrate people of Slavic decent that have immigrated to the 
United States. (05/31/12 Tr., p.37, L.24 - p.38, L.8.) Mr. Kalashnikov received support 
letters indicating that he was a good person who cares about his family and is willing to 
do whatever he can to help them. (PSI, pp.196-202.) Mr. Kalashnikov completed high 
school and was admitted into the American River College at the time of the underlying 
offense. (PSI, p.207.) At his probation violation disposition hearing, Mr. Kalashnikov 
expressed his remorse and accepted responsibility for his actions. (05/31112 Tr., pAO, 
L.20 - p. 41, L.25.) 
In sum, Mr. Kalashnikov received a sentence which was significantly harsher 
than the one recommended by the State. The harshness of his sentence is 
exacerbated by the immigration consequence of his conviction. When these two factors 
are taken into consideration with the other mitigating factors, they support the 
conclusion that his sentence is excessively harsh. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Kalashnikov respectfully requests that this Court remand this case with 
instruction to place him on probation. Alternatively, Mr. Kalashnikov respectfully 
requests that this Court reduce the fixed portion of his sentence. Alternatively, 
Mr. Kalashnikov requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 19th day of December, 2012. 
f ! 
,: l.:r ~'"~" 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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